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RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS - A SECOND ATTEMPT
IN THE HAGUE?
Justyna Regan*
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has ever experienced litigating against a for-
eigner, even in the case of a successful suit, realizes how difficult it is
to recognize or enforce that judgment abroad. Therefore, for decades
there has been a need to adopt an international instrument that could
facilitate this thorny path. The Hague Conference on International
Private Law, a neutral body established in 1893, has always played
the main role. Calling itself "a melting pot of different legal tradi-
tions,"1 the Conference currently has seventy-eight Members (seventy-
seven States and one Regional Economic Integration Organization, i.e.
the European Union).2 In the words of its Secretary General, the
Hague Conference "has offered a forum to the emerging international
community to deepen its understanding of the diversity of civil and
commercial legal systems and to develop coordination to resolve these
cross-border legal issues."3
In this paper I present the current status quo as to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments, which must be done with
reference to the first attempt to draw an international instrument in
this field. However, given that many sheets of paper have already been
dedicated to elaborating on the failure of the negotiations in the Hague
in the 1990s, Part I of this paper is limited to the main turning points
that played a decisive role in the final, disappointing outcome of the
talks. Against this background, Part II will discuss the consequences
of the lack of any international instrument to emerge. Given my Euro-
pean background, this discussion will mostly concentrate around the
current situation on the "old continent," with emphasis on the recogni-
* PhD, LLM - Polish Law Professor (PhD from the University of Wroclaw Law
School, habilitation procedure in course); Fulbright scholar (Chicago-Kent College
of Law), holding an LLM in American Business and International Law from the
Catholic University of America. Licensed attorney in Poland.
1 Home, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.netlindex en.php
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
2 Overview, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?
act=text.display&tid=26 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
3 See Hans van Loon, Legal Diversity in a Flat, Crowded Word: The Role of the
Hague Conference, 39 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 172, 174 (2011).
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tion and enforcement of judgments for punitive damages. I will pay
special attention to this, as in my opinion, punitive damages constitute
the main reason why foreign judgments are denied recognition or en-
forcement. Moreover, I will try to dispel the current myths as to the
rapprochement of both civil and common law systems.
Further, the American approach will be introduced, including
the Speech Act,4 which was adopted by Congress on August 10, 2010. I
believe that, along with the European approach, this illustrates the
nature of the current deadlock and the failure of the idea of an interna-
tional movement of judgments. Part III will investigate the "Judgment
Project" as referred to by the Hague Conference-the newest develop-
ment which will begin work on an international instrument that would
go far beyond the Convention of June 30, 2005 on Choice of Court
Agreements. I then conclude that we should learn from the previous
negotiations and try not to repeat those mistakes. Therefore, in the
course of the new project, instead of dreaming of a convention that
would reconcile feuding parties, we should be realistic and opt for a
reachable solution; most likely this would comprise a single conven-
tion. This proposal may not solve all the problems that have arisen so
far, but step-by-step it could deal with all the drawbacks, which make
the life of the foreign litigant or creditor so difficult.
I. THE HISTORY OF PREvious NEGOTIATIONS IN THE HAGUE
In the 1960s, the need for an international instrument making
the international movement of judgments easier became apparent
with the development of international trade, an increase in the num-
ber of cross-border transactions, and the growing divergence between
an individual's country of residence and the country where his or her
assets are located. Bearing in mind previous successes5 achieved by
the Hague Conference on International Private Law,6 it seemed natu-
ral to commence the drafting of a new international convention laying
down jurisdictional rules as well as recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments. The first endeavor in dealing with these issues consti-
4 Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heri-
tage Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (hereinafter "SPEECH
Act").
5 See generally Convention on Judicial Procedure for Abolishing Requirement of
Legalization for Foreign Public Document, U.S.-Neth., done Oct 5, 1961, 33 U.S.T.
883; Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents,
U.S.-Neth., done Nov 15, 1965, 20 U.N.S.T. 361; Convention on the Conflicts of
Laws Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dispositions, concluded Oct 10, 1961,
510 U.N.T.S. 175; Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural
Law For International Civil Litigation, 57 SUM L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1994).
6 Hans Van Loon, supra note 3, at 180.
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tuted the Convention of February 1, 1971 on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
that entered into force in August 1979.' Because of the political situa-
tion in the European negotiating countries, the conference excluded
jurisdiction from the substantive scope of this instrument.' With only
five countries ratifying the convention, it cannot be described as "suc-
cessful."9 Moreover, it is not even operational.1" This is due to the
mechanism of supplementary agreements that requires making bilat-
eral agreements between the parties of the convention in order to rec-
ognize and enforce judgments rendered in another state."1 Because the
convention concluded no such agreement, the convention constitutes
an example of a well-drafted theoretical proposal only. The fact that
the single convention proved unable to serve the needs of litigants in
international litigation explains the failure of the 1971 convention.12
Further explanation showed that "although it is vital to secure for a
judgment obtained in any one country effects in one or more other
countries, the first priority is to ascertain which court has interna-
tional jurisdiction to adjudicate initially on the merits of the case."13
The U.S. took the initiative in the early 1990s to start working
on an international instrument that could repeat the success of the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.' 4 Members focused only on the area of judgments. 5
7 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, available at http://www.hcch.nett
upload/conventions/txt16en.pdf.
8 Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1282 (1969).
9 Albania ratified it in April 8, 2010; Cyprus in June 8, 1976; the Netherlands in
June 21, 1979; Portugal in June 21, 1983; Kuwait in May 8, 2002. See Status Ta-
ble, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.netlindex-en.php?act=con
ventions.status&cid=78 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
10 See generally Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 21.
11 Id. art. 21 ("Decisions rendered in a Contracting State shall not be recognized
or enforced in another Contracting State in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding Articles unless the two States, being Parties to this Convention, have
concluded a Supplementary Agreement to this effect".).
12 David McClean, The Hague Conference's Judgments Project, in REFORM AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER
NORTH 259 (Peter North & James Fawcett eds., 2002).
13 CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRI-
VATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY. DOCUMENT No. 7, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 8 (1997), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd7.pdf.
14 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739.
'5 Id. art 1.
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In a letter to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Inter-
national Private Law, the Legal Advisor from the U.S. Department of
State suggested that the Conference could take up the negotiation of a
single treaty applicable to Hague Conference Member States and other
countries. 16 The proposal derived from a presumably unequal situa-
tion of U.S. judgment holders trying to enforce their judgments abroad
versus foreign plaintiffs seeking enforcement of judgments in
America.1 7 This situation resulted from overseas authorities' reluc-
tance to let U.S. judgments adjudicating punitive damages or consti-
tuting "'excessive"' jury awards' s enter into their legal systems, as
well as deficiencies in service of process on the defendant.1 9 On the
other hand, authorities claimed American law, which supposedly en-
forces any judgments that are valid and fair,2 ° in practice proved to be
respectively lenient.2 1
The U.S. initiative was greeted with enthusiasm.2 2 It was seen
as abnormal that there was a lack of any multilateral instrument
available on a global scale for the recognition and enforcement of judi-
cial decisions in a world where various economic regions were becom-
ing more interdependent every day and where more international
conventions were in place every year.2 3 In the opinion of the Hague
Conference's Permanent Bureau, such status quo made a highly unsat-
16 Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Georges
Droz, Sec'y Gen., Hague Conference of Private Int'l Law (May 5, 1992), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizationl 65973.pdf.17 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 95 A.J.I.L. 387, 418-19 (2001) (discussing the ease of enforcing
foreign judgments in the United States and the difficulty of enforcing United
States judgments abroad).
18 See id. at 419.
19 Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 9 (1998).
20 See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895).
21 See Eric B. Fastiff, The Proposed Hague Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments: A Solution to Butch Reynolds's Ju-
risdiction and Enforcement Problems, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J.469, 470-73 (1995)
(contrasting the U.S. standard of enforcing any judgment that is "valid and fair"
with the reluctance of foreign countries to enforce U.S. judgments).
22 See THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRE-
LIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 19, CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 257 (1992), available at httpJ/www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/jdgm-concll992e.pdf.
23 Tim PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, PRELIMI-
NARY DOCUMENT No. 17, SOME REFLECTIONS OF THE PERMANENT BUREAU ON A GEN-
ERAL CONVENTION ON ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 231 (1992), available at http:l
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pdl7e.pdf.
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isfactory situation for international commerce and trade, resulting in
legal uncertainty, delays, and costs which increasingly interfered with
the needs of trade and business.2 4 It concluded:
[Iun the short-term, it may seem as if doing business
abroad in a far-off region in the world with little risk of
any judgment made in that remote region ever being en-
forceable in one's own country is a comfortable affair, but
in the long-term the net result of this policy of burying
one's head in the sand will be that the foreign courts will
be tempted to exercise less self-restraint in assuming ju-
risdiction in international circumstances and be less
willing to recognize and enforce judgments from one's
own country, or a combination of both.2 5
Before work began on the wording of the future convention, the
Working Group established the convention's character. Instead of a
single convention, the Working Group decided to draft a "mixed con-
vention"2 6 that would address recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments only, because a single convention "would fall short of meet-
ing present needs."2 7 The Group intended this kind of international
agreement to follow the pattern of a double convention; hence it would
cover enforcement and recognition as well as jurisdiction. 2 s However,
unlike a double convention, it would also include a grey area, allowing
the court of origin to assume jurisdiction outside the grounds listed in
the "white list;" those which the "black list" disapproved.2 9 This ap-
proach would allow some basis of jurisdiction to remain available with-
out subjecting it to the convention's rules for recognition and
enforcement of a resulting judgment.3 ° Such a judgment would have to
24 See THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRE-
LIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 1, ANNOTATED Checklist of Issues to Be Discussed at The
Meeting of the Special Commission on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments
4 (1994), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd0l%281994%29
.pdf.
25 Id.
26 Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and The Prelimi-
nary Draft Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV.
581, 585 (2001); Ronald A. Brand, Community Competence for Matters of Judicial
Cooperation at The Hague Conference on Private International Law: A View From
The United States, 21 J.L. & CoM. 191, 196 (2002).
27 THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMI-
NARY DOCUMENT No. 19, CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON EN-
FORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 257 (1992), available at http'//www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/jdgmconcll992e.pdf.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 259-61.
30 Ronald A. Brand, supra note 26, at 584.
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be reviewed by a recognizing court in an applicable manner, in the
absence of a treaty.3 This approach would prevent the Hague Member
States from drafting an agreement covering and connecting the entire
set of jurisdictional rules.3 2 Therefore, it would allow some areas of
disagreement and leave some issues not referred to in national civil
procedure regulations outside of the drafted international instru-
ment.3 3 These issues could be covered by a later convention or protocol
after a commonly acceptable solution was reached.3 4
However, as can be seen in a report on international jurisdic-
tion and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters drawn up
by the Permanent Bureau for Special Commission, which was con-
vened to prepare a preliminary draft convention, the commission was
advised to pay special attention and priority to jurisdiction.35 The re-
port claimed that, apart from an intricate constructional system pro-
vided by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of February 1,
1971, another reason underlying its lack of success was the lack of
rules applicable to jurisdiction. 36 The Brussels Convention 37 was used
as a point of reference and a model to follow. 38 The report further ex-
plained that the main role of the future instrument would be to pro-
vide litigants with the ability to predict with a significant degree of
certainty which court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dis-
pute.3 9 Moreover, once the convention resolved this dispute, litigants
would benefit from the effects of the judgment, in other States if neces-
sary, and without having to start cumbersome and complex proceed-
ings all over again.4 °
The Special Commission adopted a preliminary draft Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
31 Id. at 585.
32 Ronald A. Brand, Community Competence, supra note, 26, at 196.
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRI-
VATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No.7, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1997), available at http:/
/www.'hch.net/upload/wop/j dgm-pd7.pdf.
36 See id. at 8.
37 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, http://curia.europa.eu/common/
recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm [Brussels Convention].
38 See KESSEDJIAN, supra note 35, at 8.
39 Id.
40 See Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, supra note 15 (suggesting that the
Hague Conference could take up the negotiation of a single treaty applicable to
Hague Conference Member States and other countries).
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Matters in 1999.41 Nevertheless, experts heavily criticized the draft
convention, mostly for remaining a "close-knit double convention
[rather than] a loose-jointed mixed convention"4 2 that seemed to result
from promoting mechanisms provided by the Brussels Convention,
without considering the fundamental differences that existed between
the negotiating countries. 43 Moreover, it was difficult to reach consen-
sus in the following six major areas: Internet and e-commerce activity-
based jurisdiction, consumer and employment contracts, intellectual
property rights, the relationship of the future convention with other
regional instruments, and bilateralism.4 4 Therefore, in order to recon-
cile conflicting approaches, the commission presented a second draft
during a diplomatic conference in June 2001.4 ' However, instead of
providing a commonly accepted solution, it merely reflected the ex-
isting dissent4 6 and hence led to the final failure of the project. In addi-
tion, the Internet, e-commerce, and de-territorialization issues that
came up during the negotiations constituted new challenges with
which the members would have to consider. 47 The longer the work con-
tinued, the more visible the differences became between the ap-
proaches adopted by the U.S. and European delegations.
The main reason that made it impossible for the American
group to accept the conventional draft was the proposed system of ju-
risdictional law. The group declared on several occasions that "their
41 See PETER NYGH & FAUSTO POCAR, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 11, PRELIMINARY DRATr CONVENTION ON JURISDIC-
TION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpdll.pdf.
42 Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction
and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Con-
ference Project Succeed?, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 191, 200 (2001).
43 See, e.g., THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 16, SOME REELECTIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE WORK
PROGRAMME OF THE CONFERENCE 5 (2002), available at http://www.hcch.netl
upload/wop/genpd16e.pdf.
44 Id. at 7.
45 See generally THE PERMANENT BUREAU & CO-REPORTERS, HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION IN COMMIS-
SION II OF THE FIRST PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 6 - 20 JUNE 200 1
(2001), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft-e.pdf.
46 See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Value-added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global En-
forcement: Why the Brussels-Philosophy failed in The Hague, 5 GERMAN L. J. 1490
(2004).
47 See AVRIL D. HAINES, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRI-
VATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 17, THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON
THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT: THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE, 22 (2002), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen-pdl7e.pdf.
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hands were tied .. . since the case law established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court was non-negotiable."4" On the other hand, "the Europe-
ans seemed to be delighted with the Brussels Convention"4 9 which led
to the tendency to make the Hague drafts as similar as possible.5 0
Given this, along with the Brussels Convention and its successor, the
Brussels Regulation, rules governing conflict of laws within the Euro-
pean Union have already been harmonized. 1 However, the same could
not have been said about the situation on the international scene.
Progressing toward a solution to the existing shortcomings of
the system, the Permanent Bureau proposed the "nucleus approach."5 2
Informal working groups followed this approach in core areas such as
jurisdiction based on choice of court agreements in business-to-busi-
ness cases, submission, defendant's forum, counterclaims, trusts,
physical torts, and certain other possible grounds. 3 In February 2002,
doubts first appeared as to the chances of achieving consensus over a
multinational convention versus some smaller instrument that would
either be a first step towards reaching the original goal, or the final
accomplishment.5 4 "The reasons for this included the wide differences
in the existing rules of jurisdiction in different States and the unfore-
seeable effects of technological developments, including the Internet,
on the jurisdictional rules that might be laid down in the conven-
tion."5 5 It may be concluded that this concern, together with a detailed
analysis of the problem of choice of court clauses, 6 and a proposal of
48 Knut Woestehoff, The Drafting Process for a Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Judgments with Special Consideration of Intellectual Property and E-Com-
merce 13 (LLM Theses & Essays, Paper No. 54, 2005), available at http://dig-
italcommons.law.uga.edu/stu-Ilm/54.
49 Brussels Convention, supra note 37.
50 THE HAGUE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND JUDGMENTS 8 (Fausto Pocar & Costanza Honorati eds., 2005).
51 See Council Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels I"), art. 33,
34, 2001 O.J. (L 12), 1, 10. (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I]
52 THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, SOME RE-
FLECTIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE WORK PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE 8 (2002).
53 Id.
54 Ronald A. Brand, Community Competence for Matters of Judicial Cooperation
at The Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra. note 26, at 195-97.
55 MASATO DOGAUCHI A & TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No: 26, PRELIMINARY
DRAFr CONVENTION ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS: EXPLANATORY
REPORT 6 (2004), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd26e.pdf.
56 MASATO DOGAUCHI & TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 19, REFLECTION
PAPER TO ASSIST IN THE PREPARATION OF A CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND REC-
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the informal group working on choice of court agreements in business-
to-business cases,57 resulted in limiting the project to choice of court
only.
However, because the Hague Convention was not meant to be a
bilateral instrument between Europe and the U.S., but rather a multi-
lateral treaty enabling the enforcement of judgments on a global scale,
it was a serious mistake to draft it based on the European standards,
"for on a global scale there was just not enough trust in order to apply
the Brussels Convention's philosophy, of a general presumption of
equivalence of norms and procedure, and thus to strictly follow the
principle of mutual recognition."5 ' According to Yoav Oestreicher, in
addition to being politically incorrect, this mistake caused a lack of
trust, taking the form of suspicion between various countries and legal
systems.5 9 Therefore, the original project failed, with the results lim-
ited to the Convention of June 30, 2005, and to the matter of choice of
court agreements only.
II. THE CURRENT STATUS Quo
Given the lack of any international convention in this re-
spect,60 currently countries have to apply their own laws that govern
rules on the enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments. Na-
tional rules do not apply if there are any regional instruments in place
OGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
MATTERS 7-21 (2002), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pdl9e
.pdf.
57 MASATO DOGAUCHI & TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT No. 26, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT CONVENTION ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS, EXPLANATORY
REPORT , available at http:/Iwww.hcch.netlupload/wop/jdgm-pd26e.pdf
58 Gralf-Peter Calliess, supra note 46, at 1498.
59 See Yoav Oestreicher, The Rise and Fall of the Mixed and Double Convention
Models Regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 6 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 339, 342-43 (2007).
60 See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 24392; Inter-Ameri-
can Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial
Validity of Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, O.A.S.T.S. No. 64; Brussels I, supra
note 52; Council Decision 2007/712, New Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
2007 O.J. (L339) 1 (EC); Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, 6 April
1983, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html; Agreement Be-
tween the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand on
Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement, Jul. 24, 2007,
available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/international-justice/trans-tasman-
court-proceedings/documents/TTCP signed-treaty.pdf.
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such as the Brussels I Regulation, which constitutes the main source
of European law as to the subject matter under analysis.6 1 However,
the Brussels I Regulation applies jurisdiction to persons domiciled in a
Member State 2 and provides recognition and enforcement to any
judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State only. 6 3 There-
fore, calling it an intra-European civil procedure instrument is abso-
lutely justified.
The current situation on the international movement of judg-
ments will be presented from two perspectives: a European one, which
is more familiar to the author and which will be elaborated on in de-
tail, and an American viewpoint. Special attention will be paid to puni-
tive damages in Europe, which are a prime example of the
inconsistencies and differing understandings that make it impossible
for some local courts to enforce foreign judgments.
A. The Situation in Europe
The European perspective on punitive damages, in most cases,
is inconsistent with a public policy of the forum,64 and constitutes the
main reason why foreign judgments are not recognized or enforced.
There is a wealth of literature on the subject from both sides of the
Atlantic.6 5 The main reason for Europe's refusal to enforce foreign
61 See Brussels I, supra note 52.
62 Id. art 2 ("[Plersons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nation-
ality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. 2. Persons who are not nationals
of the Member State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of
jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.").
63 Id. art 32 ("For the purposes of this Regulation, 'judgment' means any judgment
given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be
called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the deter-
mination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.").
64 See, e.g., Madeleine Tolani, U.S. Punitive Damages Before German Courts: a
Comparative Analysis with respect to the Ordre Public, 17 ANN. Suav. INT'L &
COMP. L. 185, 202 (2011) (describing the method to determine whether German
ordre public was violated under German law).
65 See generally Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law -
Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 109 (2003); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages Revisited: Tak-
ing the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too Far, 24 J.L. &
CoM. 181 (2005); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judg-
ments, 43 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 143 (1996); Wolfgang Wurinest, Recognition and
Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 175
(2005); John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: a Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (2006); Juliana M6rsdorf-Schulte, Funktion und Dogmatik US-
amerikanischer Punitive Damages, 67 STUDIEN ZUM AUSLANDISCHEN UND INTERNA-
TIONALEN PRIVATRECHT [STuDIPR] (1999) (Ger.); Stephan Ldke, Punitive Damages
in der schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 105 STUDIEN ZuM AUSLANDISCHEN UND INTERNATION-
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judgments, which have adjudicated punitive damages, are their incon-
sistency with the European movement's understanding of damages.
All civil law systems, whether they follow the BGB66 or the French
Napoleonic model,67 provide a monistic structure of rules of dam-
ages.6" This assumes that the sole role of damages is to compensate
the victim; therefore, adjudicated damages must be directly propor-
tional to actual damages suffered.69 As a consequence, there is an as-
sumption that damages are restricted to compensation damages
only.70 Accordingly, tortfeasor punishment is under no circumstances
a legitimate function of damages; punishment may only be pursued in
the context and by the means of criminal law.7'
To clarify the nature of punitive damages, Volker Behr identi-
fied four main differences between punitive damages and compensa-
tory damages.7 2 His first main distinction lists the purpose of
damages-compensation damages are aimed at compensating a vic-
tim's losses, whereas punitive damages are intended to punish, deter
and enforce the law.7 3 Punitive damages are awarded to punish the
tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter similar conduct in the
future. 4
Second, the way that damages are calculated is significantly
dissimilar-compensatory damages must equal the losses of the vic-
ALEN PRIVATRECHT [STuDIPR] (2003) (Ger.); Gert Brfiggemeier, Haftungsrecht:
Struktur, Prinzipien, Schutzbereich, 36 ENZYKLOPADIE DER RECHTS- UND STAAT-
SWISSENSCHAFT. ABTEILUNG RECHTSWISSENscHAFr (2006) (Ger.); Annina Schramm,
Haftung Fir Totung, 7 STUDIEN ZUM PRrVATRECHT [STUDPRIv] (2010) (Ger.); An-
sgar Staudinger, Tatort USA: Fallstricke bei der Prozessfishrung in deutschamer-
ikanischen Sachverhalten (DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT fur REISERECHT
eV), available at: http://www.dgfr.de/dgfr/download/reiserechtstage-13-staudinger
02.pdf.
66 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug.18, 1896, Das Bundesgesetz-
blatt [BGBI.] 1, as amended, art. 4, para. 5 (Ger.).
67 Code Civil [C. Civ.] (Fr.). The French civil is followed by legal systems of Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. See Napoleonic Code, EN-
CYCLOPWDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
403196/Napoleonic-code (last visited Nov.3, 2014).
68 George Georgiades, Punitive Damages in Europe and the USA: Doctrinal Differ-
ences and Practical Convergence, 58 Revue Hellnique de Droit International
[RHDI] 145, 145 (2005).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law - Tendencies
Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 105, 109-12 (2003).
73 Id. at 110.
74 Id. at 111-12.
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tim, whereas punitive damages are not determined exclusively, or
even primarily, by the losses the plaintiff suffered. 5 Instead,
[t]he award is determined by the seriousness of the
wrong, the seriousness of the plaintiffs injury, the extent
of the defendant's wealth, the profit the defendant made
from his wrongful act, the necessity to deter the defen-
dant and others like him from similar wrongful conduct,
and the necessity to improve law enforcement.7 6
Third, the latter does not focus on the victim, as is the case for
compensatory damages, but instead focuses on the tortfeasor's intent,
recklessness, or similar attitude which, not only determines whether
punitive damages are awarded, but also influences the amount of the
damages.7 7 In adjudicating punitive damages, the court considers the
economic situation of the wrongdoer, and whether, and to what extent,
he profited from his wrongful act.7 s
Lastly, the timeline perspective is different. With compensa-
tory damages, it is assumed that in the analysis of a tort, damages are
done retrospectively. By contrast, punitive damages are more prospec-
tively oriented as they are aimed at deterring the tortfeasor from fu-
ture wrongful acts and misbehavior.7"
Currently, some scholars claim that recent developments in
some European civil law systems are blurring the border between com-
pensatory damages and punitive damages.8 0 For example, under Ger-
man and Polish copyright law, in damages adjudicated in cases of right
of personality infringement, employment discrimination, and intellec-
tual property, the cases resemble American-style punitive damages
due to the multiplicity of due royalties available; explaining that such
a measure shall be adopted because the owner of the intellectual prop-
erty rights usually has difficulty proving actual damage.8 l
75 Id. at 113.
76 Id. 111.
77 Id. 111-12.
78 Id. at 112,79 Id. at 113.
80 Hartwin Bungert, Vollstreckbarkeit US-amerikanischer Schadensersatzurteile
in exorbitanter Hohe, 23-24 ZEITSCHRIFT FOYR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1707 (1992)
(Ger.); Christoph B6hmer, Spannungen im deutsch-amerikanischen Rechtsverkehr
in Zivilsachen, 1990 NEUE JURISTSCHE WOCHENscHRIFr [NJW] 3049 (1990) (Ger.);
Ernst C. Stiefel & Rolf Starner, Die Vollstreckbarkeit US-amerikanischer
Schadensersatzurteile in exzessiver Hohe, 1987 VERSICHERUNGSRECHT [VersR] 829
(1987); Madeleine Tolani, U.S. Punitive Damages Before German Courts: A Com-
parative Analysis with Respect to the Order Public, 17 ANN. SURV. INT'L & Comp. L.
185 (2011).
81 See generally Heinrich Gbtz, Die Uberwachung der Aktiengesellschaft, 40 AG
337 (1995).
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However, some valid counterarguments can be made. The first
is rooted in the European law and the second in the economic analysis
of law. First, it seems that European law, particularly European copy-
right law, refuses the idea of punitive damages existing in the field of
intellectual property. This position is declared in the Directive 2004
48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. 2 With a view of
compensating for the prejudice suffered as a result of an infringement,
the Directive's preamble states that "the amount of damages awarded
to the rightsholder should take account of all appropriate aspects, such
as loss of earnings incurred by the rightsholder, or unfair profits made
by the infringer and, where appropriate, any moral prejudice caused to
the rightsholder."s3 As an alternative example, where it would be diffi-
cult to determine the amount of the actual prejudice suffered, the
amount of the damages might be derived from elements such as the
royalties or fees that would have been due if the infringer had re-
quested authorization for intellectual property rights used. "The aim is
not to introduce an obligation to provide for punitive damages but to
allow for compensation based on an objective criterion while taking
account of the expenses incurred by the rightsholder, such as the costs
of identification and research." 4
Further, Article 13 of the Directive provides a catalog of dam-
ages such as a "lump sum on the basis of elements such as at least the
amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer
had requested authorization to use the intellectual property right in
question", 5 which constitutes an alternative to regular compensatory
damages.8 6 However, one important additional factor must be men-
tioned-the Directive sets out a minimum standard of protection that
implies that Member States can provide for measures more favorable
to the rightholder s7 while observing the principles of effectiveness, dis-
82 Directive 2004/48, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Pights, 2004 O.J. (L195) 16, 18.
83 Id. 26, at 18.
s4 Id. 26, at 18-19.
85 Id. art. 13(1)(b).
86 See, e.g., Id. art 13(1)(a) ("they shall take into account all appropriate aspects,
such as the negative economic consequences, including lost profits, which the in-
jured party has suffered, any unfair profits made by the infringer and, in appropri-
ate cases, elements other than economic factors, such as the moral prejudice
caused to the rightholder by the infringement."
87 Id. art 2(1) at 19. ("Without prejudice to the means which are or may be pro-
vided for in Community or national legislation, in so far as those means may be
more favorable for rightholders, the measures, procedures and remedies provided
for by this Directive shall apply, in accordance with Article 3, to any infringement
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suasiveness, and proportionality,"8 of which the latter is perceived to
be the most important.8 9 It is claimed by doctrine that all of the above
lead to a conclusion that any European copyright law may raise the
standard of protection as high as it finds it appropriate,9 ° unless it
serves the purpose declared in Article 13 of the Directive (i.e. it en-
ables the awarding of damages appropriate to the actual prejudice suf-
fered as a result of the infringement). Therefore, this shows that even
multiplicity of due royalties, listed by the Directive as possible dam-
ages, as long as it complies with standards spelled out above, is al-
lowed and hence does not constitute punitive damages, as long as it is
aimed at compensating damage and not punishing the tortfeasor.
From an economic analysis of law's perspective, it is also clear
that intellectual property damages deserve some special treatment. It
is stressed that they must balance protecting the rightholders' rights
on one hand and providing encouragement for others to build on ex-
isting knowledge on the other.9 1 Moreover, in line with the principle
that wrongdoing must not pay, if a rightsholder only receives damages
equivalent to royalties that would be due without tortious interfer-
ence, a potential infringer might as well take the risk, hoping that it
will go undetected. Therefore, analysts claim that damages should also
deter infringement by rendering it unprofitable-by making the in-
fringer no better off than he would have been had he never used other
peoples' property.9 2 All the above explain why intellectual property
damages cannot always correspond with the actual losses a right-
sholder suffers, as sometimes they must also encompass unfair profits
the infringer achieves. However, and this remark deserves special at-
of intellectual property rights as provided for by Community law and/or by the
national law of the Member State concerned.").
88 Supra note 68, art. 3.2. ("Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as
to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards
against their abuse.")
89 Ansgar Ohly, Three Principles of European IP Enforcement Law: Effectiveness,
Proportionality, Dissuasiveness, in TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION, CONTRIBU-
TIONS IN HONOUR OF HANNS ULLRICH 257, 270-71 (Josef Drexl ed., 2009).
90 Piotr Machnikowski, Damages for the Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights under EU Law, in COMPENSATION OF PRIVATE LOSSES: THE EVOLUTION OF
TORTS IN EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAw 88 (Reiner Schulze ed., 2011).
91 Edward F. Sherry, David J. Teece, Some Economic Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Damages, 573 PLI/Pat 399 (1999); Michael P. Akemann and Christopher J.
Pleatsikas, An Economic Perspective on Damages Calculations: Common Problems
in Specifying the But-For World, 830 PLI/Lit 105 (2010).
92 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 42 (2005); Roger D. Blair, Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules In Intellectual Property Law, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1595-96 (1998).
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tention, it never leads to punishing the tortfeasor; in the worst-case
scenario, one can only be deprived of any means one should have paid
to the rightsholder or one earned because of the infringement. From
that perspective, the bundle of damages is defendant-oriented, be-
cause it refers to his financial situation when attempting to return
things to their original state, as opposed to plaintiff-oriented damages,
which consider only the victim's feelings and estate. In any case, intel-
lectual property damages are never aimed at punishing the defendant,
but rather, they attempt to refrain from rewarding his conduct.
The above facts prove that the traditional view on damages is
evolving, and in certain fields, it modifies calculation of an amount due
to the plaintiff. However, from the author's point of view, as long as
the purpose thereof is to compensate rather than punish, damages
shall not fall into the punitive category. 93 But, one must also note that
the U.S. legal order, which constitutes a flag example of a system pro-
viding for punitive damages, is slowly modifying its approach to puni-
tive damages by trying to impose some restrictions on the method of
their calculation. 94 Moreover, many state courts and legislatures have
already adopted standards and procedures limiting the jury's discre-
tion in awarding punitive damages. For instance, some legislatures en-
acted statutes limiting the amount of punitive damages by capping
possible awards.95
Hence, one can conclude that even though both civil and com-
mon law systems seem to modify their approaches to damages, result-
ing in a situation where the differences between them are not as clear
as some decades ago, claiming that this change could result in the
adoption of a more favorable attitude towards the enforcement of for-
eign punitive judgments in Europe appears an overstatement. 96 As
long as damages serve a different purpose, even though the gap be-
tween adjudicated amounts may decrease, European nations will not
enforce them.
93 The European reluctance as to punitive damages is particularly visible in Regu-
lation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) that in recital
26 declares that the application of a provision of the law designated by this Regu-
lation which would have the effect of causing noncompensatory exemplary or puni-
tive damages of an excessive nature to be awarded may, depending on the
circumstances of the case and the legal order of the Member State of the court
seized, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the
forum.
94 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
95 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (West 2014).
96 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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B. The Situation in the US
In the opinion of many academics from the U.S., "the judg-
ments of foreign courts find a warmer welcome [in the U.S.] ... than
U.S. judgments do in the foreign courts."9 7 However, even if this en-
thusiasm is justified with regard to judgments issued by the courts of
jurisdictions with legal cultures resembling the U.S., it is not so evi-
dent in the case of judgments delivered in other places.9" This is why
the first recognition of a Chinese judgment 99 was seen as a mile-
stone.1"' The U.S. grounds its beliefs regarding foreign judgments in
97 David P. Steward, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments In the
United States, 12 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 179 (2010). See also Matthew H. Adler, If
We Build It, Will They Come?-The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 79, 81 (1994) (stating that "the consensus" in academic circles and in the U.S.
Department of State "is that individuals seeking enforcement of U.S. judgments
abroad have not had the same good fortune as foreign litigants seeking enforce-
ment in the United States"); Linda J. Silberman, Enforcement And Recognition Of
Foreign Country Judgments In The United States, 704 PLI/Lit 365 (2004); Mark D.
Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV.
783 (2004); J. Noelle Hicks, Andrew P. Vance Memorial Writing Competition Win-
ner Facilitating International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legislation Gov-
erning The Enforcement Of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002);
Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments And The Need
For Reform, 14 U.C. DAviS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 111 (2007); Arthur W. Rovine, En-
forcement In The United States Of Foreign Judgments And Foreign Arbitration
Awards, 41 RMMLF-INST 9 (1995).
98 See Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., The Enforcement Of Foreign Court Judgments In The
People's Republic Of China: What The American Lawyer Needs To Know, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 241 (1997) (highlighting how differently China and the United
States enforce foreign judgments).
99 Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. Co. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., 425 F. App'x
580, 581 (9th Cir. 2011).
100 See generally Mark Moedritzer, Kay C. Whittaker, & Ariel Ye, Judgments
'Made In China'But Enforceable in The United States?: Obtaining Recognition and
Enforcement in the United States of Monetary Judgments Entered in China
Against U.S. Companies Doing Business Abroad, 44 INT'L LAW. 817 (2010) (ex-
plaining how to obtain recognition and enforcement of a Chinese monetary judg-
ment in the United States); Jie Huang, Conflicts Between Civil Law and Common
Law in Judgment Recognition and Enforcement: When is the Finality Dispute Fi-
nal?, 29 Wis. INT'L L.J. 70 (2011) (discussing the conflict in judgment recognition
and enforcement between civil law-abiding mainland China and Macao and com-
mon-law following Hong Kong); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Rob-
ertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011) (discussing how plaintiffs in transnational lawsuits
are frequently denied both court access in the United States and a remedy based
on a foreign court's judgment); Christina Weston, The Enforcement Loophole:
Judgment-Recognition Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Con-
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the notion of comity that the American Supreme Court explained in
Hilton v. Guyot:
[NIeither a matter of absolute obligation, nor of mere
courtesy and good will. It is a recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or other persons who are under
the protection of its laws." 10 1
However, recently, the first dark cloud-the Speech Act-gath-
ered on this recognition-friendly horizon. British "libel tourism"1 °2
triggered it, meaning that it was easy for foreign plaintiffs to bring
their defamation claims in front of British courts, with the application
of English law, even though the connections between the cases and the
English jurisdiction was remote. 103 The problem of foreign and, more
precisely, European defamation judgments, became the subject of a
public debate started by the American journalist Rachel Ehrenfeld,
who an Arabic businessman and his family sued in London because
they took offense with Ehrenfeld listing their name in a book entitled
"Funding Evil" amongst terrorism financiers.104 Even though her
counterclaim brought in New York was unsuccessful, 0 5 the debate as
to British libel tourism's influence on American citizens commenced.
As a result, the State of New York adopted the "Libel Terrorism Pro-
tection Act" that enabled New York courts to assert jurisdiction over
anyone who obtains a foreign libel judgment against a New York pub-
lisher or writer, and limited enforcement to those judgments that sat-
duct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 731 (2011) (discussing the barriers foreign
plaintiffs face when seeking civil recovery against American corporations).101 Id.
102 Geoffrey Ronald Robertson, Media Inquiry Ducked Key Reforms, Guardian,
Feb. 23, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/feb/24/mps-me-
dia-legal-geoffrey-robertson (coining the term "libel tourism").
103 See generally Daniel C. Taylor, Libel Tourism: Protecting Authors And Preserv-
ing Comity, 99 GEO. L.J. 189 (2010) (discussing the increasing number of lawsuits
for libel against American authors in plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions); Robert L.
McFarland, Please Do Not Publish This Article In England: A Jurisdictional Re-
sponse To Libel Tourism, 79 Miss. L.J. 617 (2010) (discussing the use of plaintiff-
friendly British courts for libel suits against American authors on the basis of in-
significant British contacts); Andrew R. Klein Some Thoughts on Libel Tourism 38
PEPP. L. REV. 375 (2011) (discussing the dodging of American free speech protec-
tions by plaintiffs suing American authors for libel in more plaintiff-friendly for-
eign jurisdictions).
104 Lili Levi, The Problem Of Trans-National Libel, 60 Am. J. COMP. L. 507, 512-
514 (2012).
105 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 545 (2nd. Cir. N.Y. 2007).
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isfy the freedom of speech and press protections guaranteed by both
the United States and New York Constitutions.1 °6 Legislatures from
Illinois,1 ° 7 Florida,10 s California,1 0 9 Tennessee,1 10 and Maryland 1
followed New York's lead. However, this trend proved to be only an
introduction to the Speech Act that was finally adopted in August
2010. In the body of the statute it claims that
[s]ome persons are obstructing the free expression rights
of United States authors and publishers, and in turn
chilling the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States interest of the citizenry in receiving infor-
mation on matters of importance, by seeking out foreign
jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of free-
speech protections to authors and publishers that are
available in the United States, and suing a United States
author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction." 2
The Speech Act continues by stating that the above "not only suppress
the free speech rights of the defendants to the suit, but inhibits other
written speech that might otherwise have been written or published
but for the fear of a foreign lawsuit."1 1 3
Against this background, the statute adopts a rule that any
American federal or state court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign
defamation judgment without the presence of one of two factors. Ei-
ther the law the foreign court applies must comply with the require-
ments laid down by the First Amendment of the American
Constitution and the Constitution and law of the state housing the do-
mestic court, or the U.S. court proceedings must lead to the same con-
clusion that the defendant is liable for defamation.
However, as noted by Mark Rosen, one may assert that the
wording of the Speech Act, and hence its scope of application, is
broader than its creators planned.1 1 4 This is true as to both the per-
sonal and subject matter of application. Regarding personal applica-
tion, even though one may expect that the Speech Act would aim at
106 NY CLS CPLR § 302(d); NY CLS CPLR § 5304(b)(8).
107 735 ILL COMP STAT. 5/12-621(b)(7) (2008); 735 ILL COMP STAT. 5/2-209(14)(b-5)
(2014).
108 FLA. STAT. §§ 55.605(2)(h); FLA. STAT. 55.6055 (2009).
109 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§1716(c)(9) & 1717(c) (West 2009).
110 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6-108(3)(c) & 26-6-104(d) (West 2010).
Ill MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PRoc. §§ 6-103.3(b) & 10-704(5)(c) (West 2010).
112 Securing The Protection Of Our Enduring And Established Constitutional
Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 2(2) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 4101-05 (2010)).
113 Id. at § 2(3).
114 Mark Rosen, The Speech Act's Unfortunate Parochialism: of Libel Tourism and
Legitimate Pluralism, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 101-02.
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protecting American citizens and corporations,1 1 5 it makes no refer-
ence of this kind when defining its personal scope of application. This
simply means that in any proceeding as to the recognition or enforce-
ment of a foreign defamation judgment, the court must apply the
Speech Act. It also weakens arguments that try to explain the need to
adopt the Speech Act constitutionally, 116 as it seems that the scope of
its personal application is broader than the U.S. Constitution. Regard-
ing subject matter application, the Speech Act, even though it literally
cites British libel tourism as its trigger, applies to all kinds of defama-
tion judgments without differentiating -its country of origin or kind of
alleged defamatory statement. This means that the Speech Act could
apply to some matters that do not fall under U.S. interests. An exam-
ple of this could be a case between citizens of a foreign jurisdiction,
with a verdict affecting that jurisdiction only, but whose judgment the
plaintiff attempts to enforce in the U.S. because the defendant trans-
ferred or locates its assets there.
In light of these facts, because of the unfortunately wide scope
of application of the Speech Act, in the opinion of this paper's author,
the Act does not articulate a national "public policy" based on the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, it heralds a new Ameri-
can approach in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. 1 7 Because of the prerequisites it laid down, the court will
have to revise the foreign judgment (referred to as "rvision au fond")
by applying American defamation law. In other words, the procedure
comprises checking whether the foreign judgment complies with U.S.
standards. One could say that this resembles the procedure European
courts follow when it comes to recognizing judgments allowing puni-
tive damages. As one can observe from German, 1 18 Italian," 9 and Po-
lish' 2 ° case law, such judgments may enter the local movement of
judgments in the part that refers to compensatory damages. However,
in contrast to procedures the Speech Act lays down, the judgment's
115 There is even a definition of a United States person. See 28 U.S.C. § 4101(6).
116 Marissa Gerny, The Speech Act Defends The First Amendment: A Visible And
Targeted Response To Libel Tourism, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 409, 416, 420-21
(2012).
117 David P. Stewart, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
United States, 12 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 179, 197 (2010).
118 Gerhard Wegen & James Sherer, Federal Court of Justice Decision Concerning
the Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments Awarding Punitive Damages,
32 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1320, 1324 (1993).119 Parrott v. Fimez S.p.A., App. sez. trez, 15 Jan. 1995, n.0319, Giur. it. 1995
1.1,132 (It.), translated in Lucia Ostoni, Italian Rejection of Punitive Damages in a
U.S. Judgment, 24 J.L. & COM. 245, 251-62 (2005).
120 S~d Apelacyjny w Warszawie I Wydziat Cywilny [Warsaw Court of Appeal
Civil Division] Jan. 26, 2012 Sygn. akt I ACz 2059/11 (Pol.).
2015]
82 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 14:1
merits are never checked, and the sole discretionary decision is the
final amount adjudicated.
III. THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE HAGUE
Currently, the Hague Conference on International Private Law
considers resuming work on an international instrument that would
deal with the issue at stake. 121 In order to do so, the Council consented
to a suggestion to convene a group of experts to examine current devel-
opments in the area of international litigation and the feasibility of a
new global instrument. Currently, the group comprises representa-
tives from fifteen countries along with one representative from the Re-
gional Economic Integration Organization (i.e. the European Union).
The increasing number of cross-border transactions and foreign invest-
ments explained the need for a movement of judgments structure, as
did current developments on both sides of the ocean. 122 However, this
growing internationalization triggers a need for effective public insti-
tutions and an efficient dispute resolution process. 1 23 Otherwise, en-
trepreneurs conducting cross-border trade, particularly small and
medium enterprises, will become vulnerable to the costs of resolving
international disputes, which could influence their decisions of
whether to begin or continue doing business abroad.1 24
Nevertheless, the fundamental aspect the group of experts
must decide is the type and model of the future instrument. Regarding
the type, there are three options available: a convention, an "e la carte
convention," 125 and a non-binding instrument. There are arguments
supporting each of the above alternatives: if the experts indeed begin
121 Permanent Bureau, Continuation of the Judgments Project, (Hague Confer-
ence on Private Int'l Law, Prel. Doc. No. 14, Feb. 2010) at 3, 5, available at http:fl
www.hcch.nettupload/wop/genaff2010pdl4e.pdf. See Hans Van Loon, The Hague
Conference on Private International Law: Work in Progress (2008-2010), in 12 Y.B.
PRIVATE INT'L L. 419, 431 (2010).
122 See generally Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d
159, 160-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concerning a possible conflict between the laws of
forum state New York and Ecuador).
123 See generally World Bank Group Staff, Investing Across Borders 2010: Indica-
tors of Foreign Direct Investment Regulation in 87 Economies (2010) (detailing the
need for an effective commercial arbitration regime for foreign investors), availa-
ble at http://iab.worldbank.org/-/media/FPDKMI/AB/DocumentsIAB-report.pdf.
124 Permanent Bureau, Ongoing Work on International Litigation and Possible
Continuation of the Judgment Project, (Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law,
Prel. Doc. No 5, Mar. 2012), at 8, available at: http://ww w.hcch.net/upload/wop/
gapl2pd05e.pdf.
125 David Goddard QC, Forum allocation and Judgments Convention - Next Steps,
received upon request of the Author of this paper from the Hague Conference on
International Private Law.
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working on a future convention, it would need to be commensurate
with the Statute of the Conference on International Private Law,126
and this type of an instrument would increase its possible applicabil-
ity. However, given the previous difficulties during the negotiations in
the 1990s in reaching an agreement on grounds of jurisdiction, David
Goddard proposed drafting a convention for which the participants
would not have to sign up for every chapter. In other words, it would
include a number of "optional chapters," and it could therefore elimi-
nate or at least reduce possible controversies.' 27 The third possible
scenario assumes working on a non-binding instrument, such as model
law, based on the successful experiences of other international organi-
zations. 128 However, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference
has already indicated that it will consider that only if the other options
are exhausted. 129
A model must be established in case the experts decide that
work shall commence on a convention. There are three possibilities in
this respect: a "simple" model, a "reinforced simple" model, or a double
convention. The simple convention-reflecting a "bottom up" approach
that concentrates on those areas where achieving consensus is feasi-
ble13°-would deal with recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments only, and would not embrace the problem of jurisdiction
directly.' However, it would have to address this issue indirectly by
defining both permissible bases of jurisdiction (a positive catalogue)
and non-permissible (a negative catalogue). Such a reinforced simple
126 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1955,
220 U.N.T.S.121, available at http://www.hcch.netlindex-en.php?act=conventions
.text&cid=29.
127 Goddard, supra note 126, at 8.
128 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as
adopted in 2006, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts
arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.html; see also European Max Planck Group on
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP), Principles on Conflict of Laws in
Intellectual Property 1, 6 (2011), http://www.cl-ip.eu/files/pdf2/FinalText 1_De
cember_2011.pdf.
129 Permanent Bureau, Continuation of the Judgments Project, (Hague Confer-
ence on Private Int'l Law, Prel. Doc. No. 14, Feb. 2010), at 7, available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff20l0pdl4e.pdf.
130 Permanent Bureau, Review of the Activities of the Conference in Regard to the
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, (Hague Conference on Private Int'l
Law, Prel. Doc. No. 12, March 2011), at 3, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/
wop/genaff2011pd12e.pdf.
131 See Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Developments and The New Hague Judg-
ment Project, in A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw - ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 89, 90 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 2013-19, 2013).
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model would follow the pattern of the simple convention, but addi-
tional provisions on the circulation of judgments either at the jurisdic-
tion stage or at the recognition and enforcement stage would
complement it. 132 The double convention, on the contrary, would ad-
dress enforcement and recognition, as well as jurisdiction.
Before analyzing the above possible scenarios, experts must in-
vestigate a new approach aimed at proving that no international in-
strument dealing with foreign judgments is needed. These days, many
claim that because of the emergence of "spontaneous harmoniza-
tion"13 3 of the prerequisites for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, a convention on an international level is no longer neces-
sary. 1 This view is deemed rooted in the rapprochement of regimes
resulting from negotiations of many international and bilateral con-
ventions that, even if not successful, national courts and legislators
have reconsidered and adopted similar approaches. 135 Moreover, (it is
believed that) most of the negotiations on international instruments
have been more concentrated on jurisdiction than enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments which, in the opinion of some schol-
ars, would prove the lack of need for an international convention in
this respect. Even more, it would prove that it is possible to solve this
question with bilateral agreements only.136
However, some sound counterarguments exist. Even if the opti-
mism about liberalization of recognition and enforcement require-
ments is justified regarding most of the Member States of the
European Union and the U.S., the same cannot be said about Nordic
countries. There, foreign judgments that do not fall into any interna-
tional agreement are not recognized.' 3 7 Also, many Arabic countries
132 Id. at 98.
133 See Friedrich. K. Juenger, The Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 8 (1988) (explaining
this concept as a moving trend toward unilateral liberalization of recognition and
enforcement prerequisites resulting from a moving trend).
134 B6ligh Elbalti, Armonizaci6n Espontdnea de los Requisitos para el
Reconocimiento y Ejecucidn de Decisiones Judiciales Extranjeras y la Necesidad de
un Convenio Global Sobre Decisiones Judiciales, 11 ANUARIO ESPA&OL DE DER-
ECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 246 (2011).
135 See Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, General Report Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, in RECOGNITION AND ENOFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS 1, 12-14 (Ger-
hard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner eds., 2000)
136 Walter & Baumgartner, supra note 133, at 252.
137 See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet 182
(Kliwer Law Int'l, 2007); see also Mikael Berlund, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Sweden, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
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provide for a jurisdictional test ' as one of the prerequisites for recog-
nition and enforcement, which involves re-examining the jurisdiction
of an issuing court and thereby applying a double standard.13 9 Fur-
thermore, one must bear in mind that some countries still apply reci-
procity in order to recognize or enforce foreign judgments. 4 °
Nevertheless, the fact that most countries follow a similar pattern as
to enforcement and recognition prerequisites should be perceived as a
good sign before entering into international negotiations. Regarding
the history of the Hague negotiations, (it is justified to say that) the
discussion was focused on jurisdictional matters, as this sphere was
perceived as the most difficult. In the end, this led to the failure of the
entire project.
As to the proposal of replacing a future multi-national agree-
ment with bilateral conventions, one may appropriately examine the
analysis performed by David Goddard, proving that the success behind
the Trans-Tasman agreement"' resulted from seven factors. 14 2 God-
dard pointed out the features that contributed to the success of the
agreement as: a high level of confidence in the ability and willingness
of the courts of both countries to apply a structured discretion in rela-
tion to the granting of a stay; their willingness to address, through
appeals or other mechanisms, concerns about process issues raised in
JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND LUGANO CONVENTIONS 529-
36 (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner eds., 2000); Juha Lappalainen,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of Applica-
tion of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions: Finland, in RECOGNITION AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BRUSSELS AND
LUGANO CONVENTIONS 169-81 (Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner eds.,
2000).
138 See generally Mark Wakim, Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement Of
Foreign International Arbitral Awards in the Middle East, 21 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1,
37-38 (2008) (discussing choice of law in international commercial disputes in the
middle east); Husain M. Al-Baharna, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards in the GCC countries with Particular Reference to Bahrain, 4
ARAB L.Q. 332, 334-35 (1989) (discussing the application of the Arab League Con-
vention of 1952 to foreign arbitral awards); Jalila Sayed Ahmed, Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Some Arab Countries-Legal Provisions and Court Prece-
dents: Focus on Bahrain, 14 ARAB L.Q. 169, 171 (1999) (discussing the enforce-
ment of foreign commercial judgments in Bahrain).
139 Goddard, supra note 126, at 259.
140 See Dennis Campbell & Dharmendra Popat, Enforcing American Money Judg-
ments In The United Kingdom And Germany, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517 (1994) (evoking
Germany as an example of a country that applies reciprocity in recognition and
enforcement of international judgments).
141 See Kim Pham, Enforcement of Non-Monetary Foreign Judgments in Australia,
30 SYDNEY L. REV. 663. (2008).
142 Goddard, supra note 126 at 15.
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relation to a judgment given in other countries; and the history of judi-
cial cooperation between the two countries involved, resulting in them
encountering few concerns in practice in relation to civil proceedings
and judgments. 14 ' However, he also indicated two other factors which
may seem to throw up merely logistical challenges, but actually make
concluding effective bilateral agreements between any two given coun-
tries impossible. These are the sometimes long and expensive travel
between two countries and a lack of confidence that remote appear-
ances by parties and counsel can work on a practical level. 14 4 Given
that in cases of countries that are distant from each other, the above
negative features will always exist, adopting an effective and operative
bilateral agreement seems rather unlikely. Therefore, the only way to
ensure an international movement of judgments is to deal with the
problem in the international arena.
CONCLUSION
The question that I strove to answer in this paper referred to a
need for agreement on a movement-of-judgments international instru-
ment, and the feasibility of reaching such an agreement. Regarding
the need, I opine that due to the internationalization of the market
and the continuous increase of cross-border trade and resulting in-
crease in disputes involving parties from different regions of the world,
the demand for an international convention that would embrace juris-
diction, enforcement, and recognition of foreign judgments is unques-
tionable. However, the lesson learned during the colossal failure of the
multi-national dream of creating an instrument that could bridge
many nations in the Hague led the international community to realize
that basing the agreement on a "mixed" or "double" conventional
model was a big mistake from the very beginning.1 4 Even though the
problems of jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition of judgments
are intertwined, it does not mean that they are inseparable.
Therefore, in the opinion of this paper's author, it is highly ad-
visable to continue work on the latter issue only and come back to ju-
risdiction issues when an agreement regarding enforcement and
recognition is reached. As suggested by Yoav Oestreicher, "even
though... [this] solution... may be less attractive than a double or
mixed convention because it provides less predictability and certainty,
it is still a good solution, at least in the short run."1 4 6 However, it must
143 Id. at 6.
144 Id. at 7.
145 Yoav Oestreicher, "We're on a Road to Nowhere" - Reasons for the Continuing
Failure to Regulate Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 42 INT'L
LAw. 59, 59, 71-72 (2008).
146 Pocar & Honorati, supra note 47, at 351.
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be stressed that continuing work on recognition and enforcement only
would not mean that the problem of jurisdiction would disappear. The
future instrument would have to address tolerable grounds of jurisdic-
tion only for the purpose of recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment147 and the circumstances under which the court of the state
of origin's jurisdiction may go unrecognized.
However, as optimistically suggested by the Hague Conference
on Private International Law, agreeing on the above "would be more
feasible than reaching consensus on direct grounds of jurisdiction." 48
This confidence is also rooted in the new rule of undertaking decisions
which was switched from the traditional voting procedure to the con-
sensus principle.149 This, according to the opinion of the Secretary
General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, "has
its price in terms of negotiation time, but recent experience tends to
show its benefits in terms of greater inclusiveness." 5 ° This solution
also meets the expectation of Peter D. Trooboff-an American delegate
who took part in the negotiations over the convention in the 1990s-to
work out a mechanism in which no participating states would prevail
by votes that would ignore the legitimate concern of other
delegations. 51
There are several advantages to the proposal of working on the
multi-national convention instead of covering the world with a net of
bilateral agreements. First, such an international agreement could
end problems with reciprocity. Given that it would be binding in every
state that acceded to the convention, the treatment of foreign judg-
ment would be standardized, and would be the same in every country
that is party to the convention. Second, it could provide some defini-
tion of public policy that thus far has been understood differently by
147 Also referred to as "indirect grounds of jurisdiction."
148 Permanent Bureau, Continuation of the Judgments Project, (Hague Confer-
ence on Private Int'l Law, Prel. Doc. No. 14, Feb. 2010), at 6, available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pdl4e.pdf.
149 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1955,
220 U.N.T.S. 121, at art. 8(2) ("The Sessions, Council and Special Commissions
shall, to the furthest extent possible, operate on the basis of consensus."), available
at http://www.hcch.nettindex-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=29.
150 Hans van Loon, Legal Diversity in a Flat, Crowded World: The Role of the
Hague Conference, 39 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 172, 183 (2011).
151 Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a World-
wide Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments:
Some Initial Lessons, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS
FROM THE HAGUE 263, 277 (John J. Barcel6 III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
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different jurisdictions, 1 52 resulting in many inconsistencies between
conflicting systems. What is also notable, even though it represents an
argument against adopting a multi-state convention, is the fact that in
most cases, the refusal of recognition or enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment is based on public-policy exception. 15 This is something we sim-
ply have to live with as any international instrument will not be able
to change this status quo.
Moreover, it would be advisable to include in the future con-
vention a substantive provision that would require the court of origin
to specify the various heads of damage. In particular, it would be ad-
visable to indicate which constitute compensatory damages and which
are of a punitive character. That would significantly facilitate a role of
the requested court which, in the case of a refusal based on punitive
damages falling into a public policy exception, would know which part
of the judgment it can recognize and which it must reject."' This is in
line with the recommendations laid down by the Hague Conference on
International Private Law. 155
Another thing that needs to be carefully weighed is the choice
between a single-subject convention and a single trans-substantive
convention. As suggested by Mark Rosen, given the complexity and di-
versity between the different areas of civil and business law, it may be
easier to come up with a convention or conventions that would apply to
a certain area of the law only. This could further serve as an experi-
ment to work out best practices that could be further extended and
used to cover all kinds of judgments.1 56 Whichever method is chosen to
effect the final result (i.e. adopting a multi-national convention which
152 See Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception To The Enforcement Of
Foreign Judgments: Necessary Or Nemesis?, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 795,
817-18 (1996).
153 Gralf-Peter Calliess, Value-added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global En-
forcement: Why the Brussels-Philosophy Failed in the Hague, 5 GERMAN L. J. 1490,
1496 (2004) (Summarizing "[alt the end of the day both the citizens of Europe and
of the USA seem to be quite comfortable with the idea that the mutual enforce-
ment of judgments is possible in principle but subject to a public-policy test on a
case-by-case basis.").
154 The fact that a judgment can be recognized or enforced partially, is not a sub-
ject of any discussion anymore. See John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages
in International Commercial Arbitrations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 59, 104 (1997).
155 Permanent Bureau, Note on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in
the Perspective of a Double Convention With Special Regard to Foreign Judg-
ments Awarding Punitive or Excessive Damages, (Hague Conference on Private
Int'l Law, Prel. Doc. No. 4, May 1996), at 16, 24, available at http://www.hcch.netl
upload/wop/jdgm-pd04%281996%29.pdf.
156 Mark Rosen, The Speech Act's Unfortunate Parochialism: of Libel Tourism and
Legitimate Pluralism, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 99, 122-23 (2012).
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overcomes the current impasse), it will be justified because given the
current status quo, the end justifies the means. However, only time
will tell whether the newest initiative of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law will be successful.
